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COFYRIGHT. 1»ie. BY MEYER « THALHBIMER. BALTIMORE. MD. 



GENERAL PERSHING'S 

OWN STORY 
OF THE VICTORIOUS 
AMERICAN ARMY 



\\v\\A\Millll/f'//'^V^. 




FROM THE REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY OF WAR 

1918 




COPYRIGHT BY HARRIS ft E' 



GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING 

•JAN 20 1919 ©CLA510568 



General Pershing's O^vn Story of the 
Victorious American Army 



November 20, 1918. 

To the Secretary of War: 

My Dear Mr. Secretary: 

In response to your request, I have the honor to submit this brief 
summary of the organization and operations of the American Expedi- 
tionary Force from May 26, 1917, until the signing of the armistice, 
November 11, 1918. Pursuant to your instructions, immediately upon 
receiving my orders I selected a small staff and proceeded to Europe 
in order to become familiar with conditions at the earliest possible 
moment. 

The warmth of our reception in England and France was only 
equaled by the readiness of the commanders in chief of the veteran 
armies of the Allies and their staffs to place their experience at our 
disposal. In consultation with them the most effective means of co- 
operation of effort was considered. With French and British armies at 
their maximum strength, and all efforts to dispossess the enemy from 
his firmly intrenched positions in Belgium and France failed, it was 
necessary to plan for an American force adequate to turn the scale in 
favor of the Allies. Taking account of the strength of the Central 
Powers at that time, the immensity of the problem which confronted 
us could hardly be overestimated. The first requisite being an organi- 
zation that could give intelligent direction to effort, the formation of 
a General Staff occupied my early attention. 



A well organized General Staff through which the commander exer- General 
cises his functions is essential to a successful modern army. However 
capable our division, our battalion, and our companies as such, success 
would be impossible without thoroughly co-ordinated endeavor. A 
General Staff broadly organized and trained for war had not hitherto 
existed in our Army. Under the Commander in Chief, this staff must 
carry out the policy and direct the details of administration, supply, 
preparation, and operations of the Army as a whole, with all special 
branches and bureaus subject to its control. As models to aid us we 
had the veteran French General Staff and the experience of the British 
who had similarly formed an organization to meet the demands of a 
great army. By selecting from each the features best adapted to our 
basic organization, and fortified by our own early experience in the 
war, the development of our great General Staff system was completed. 

The General Staff is naturally divided into five groups, each with 
its chief who is an assistant to the Chief of the General Staff. G. 1 is 
in charge of organization and equipment of troops, replacements, ton- 
nage, priority of overseas shipment, the auxiliary welfare association 
and cognate subjects; G. 2 has censorship, enemy intelligence, gather- 
ing and disseminating information, preparation of maps, and all simi- 
lar subjects: G. 3 is charged with all strategic studies and plans, move- 



Staff 



General ^^^^ °^ troops, and the supervision of combat operations; G. 4 co-ordi- 
o rr nates important questions of supply, construction, transport arrange- 
^^^ ments for combat, and of the operations of the service of supply, and of 
hospitalization and the evacuation of the sick and wounded; G. 5 super- 
vises the various schools and has general direction and co-ordination 
of education and training. 
' The first Chief of Staff was Col. (now Maj. Gen.) James G. Harbord, 

who was succeeded in May, 1918, by Maj. Gen. James W. McAndrew. 
To these officers, to the deputy Chief of Staff, and to the assistant Chiefs 
of Staff, who, as heads of sections, aided them, great credit is due for 
the results obtained not only in perfecting the General Staff organiza- 
tion but in applying correct principles to the multiplicity of pi'oblems 
that have arisen. 

Q , . ,. After a thorough consideration of allied organizations it was de- 

cided that our combat division should consist of four regiments of 
and infantry of 3,000 men, with three battalions to a regiment and four 
Training companies of 250 men each to a battalion, and of an artillery brigade 
of three regiments, a machine-gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a 
trench-mortar battery, a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the head- 
quarters staffs and military police. These, with medical and other 
units, made a total of over 28,000 men, or practically double the size 
of a French or German division. Each corps would normally consist of 
six divisions — four combat and one depot and one replacement division 
— and also two regiments of cavalry, and each army of from three to 
five corps. With four divisions fully trained, a corps could take over 
an American sector with two divisions in line and two in reserve, with 
the depot and replacement divisions prepared to fill the gaps in the 
ranks. 

Our purpose was to prepare an integral American force which should 
be able to take the offensive in every respect. Accordingly, the develop- 
ment of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of the rifle 
and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The plan 
of training after arrival in France allowed a division one month for 
acclimatization and instruction in small units from battalions down, 
a second month in quiet trench sectors by battalion, and a third month 
after it came out of the trenches when it should be trained as a com- 
plete division in war of movement. 

Very early a system of schools was outlined and started, which 
should have the advantage of instruction by officers direct from the 
front. At the great school center at Langres, one of the first to be 
organized, was the staff school, where the principles of general staff 
work, as laid down in our own organization, were taught to carefully 
selected officers. Men in the ranks, who had shown qualities of leader- 
ship, were sent to the school of candidates for commissions. A school 
of the line taught younger officers the principles of leadership, tactics, 
and the use of the different weapons. In the artillery school, at Saumur, 
young officers were taught the fundamental principles of modern artil- 
lery; while at Issoudun an immense plant was built for training cadets 
in aviation. These and ether schools, with their well-considered cur- 
riculums for training in every branch of our organization, were co- 
ordinated in a manner best to develop an efficient army out of willing 
and industrious young men, many of whom had not before known 
even the rudiments of military technique. Both Marshal Haig and 
General Petain placed officers and men at our disposal for instructional 
purposes, and we are deeply indebted for the opportunities given to 
profit by their veteran experience. 



z 



one 



The eventual place the American Army should take on the western American. 
front was to a large extent influenced by the vital question of com- 
munication and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded 
by the British Armies' shipping and supplies while the southern ports, 
though otherwise at our service, had not adequate port facilities for 
our purposes and these we should have to build. The already overtaxed 
railway system behind the active front in northern France would not 
be available for us as lines of supply and those leading from the 
southern ports of northeastern France would be unequal to our needs 
without much new construction. Practically all warehouses, supply 
depots and regulating stations must be provided by fresh construc- 
tions. While France offered us such material as she had to spare after 
a drain of three years, enormous quantities of material had to be brought 
across the Atlantic. 

With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in 
making plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. 
Moreover, broad plans comimensurate with our national purpose and re- 
sources would bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the 
front line, to the nations associated with us in the war, and to the 
enemy. The tonnage for material for necessary construction for the 
supply of an army of three and perhaps four million men would require 
a mammoth program of shipbuilding at home, and miles of dock con- 
struction in France, with a corresponding large project for additional 
railways and for storage depots. 

All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we 
were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the 
war we must utilize the southern ports of France — Bordeaux, La Pallice, 
St. Nazaire, and Brest — and the comparatively unused railway systems 
leading therefrom to the northeast. Generally speaking, then, this 
would contemplate the use of our forces against the enemy somewhere 
in that direction, but the great depots of supply must be centrally 
located, preferably in the area included by Tours, Bourges, and Chateau- 
roux, so that our armies could be supplied with equal facility wherever 
they might be serving on the western front. 

To build up such a system there were talented men in the Regular Qfovvfh of 
Army, but more experts were necessary than the Army could furnish. . ^ 
Thanks to the patriotic spirit of our people at home, there came from ^'^^ aervice 
civil life men trained for every sort of work involved in building and of Supply 
managing the organization necessary to handle and transport such 
an army and keep it supplied. With such assistance the construction 
and general development of our plans have kept pace with the growth 
of the forces, and the Service of Supply is now able to discharge from 
ships and move 45,000 tons daily, besides transporting troops and 
material in the conduct of active operations. 

As to organization, all the administrative and supply services, 
except the Adjutant General's, Inspector General's, and Judge Advo- 
cate General's Departments which remain at general headquarters, 
have been transferred to the headquarters of the services of supplies 
at Tours under a commanding general responsible to the commander 
in chief for supply of the armies. The Chief Quartermaster, Chief 
Surgeon, Chief Signal Officer, Chief of Ordnance, Chief of Air Serv- 
ice, Chief of Chemical Warfare, the general purchasing agent in all 
that pertains to questions of procurement and supply, the Provost 
Marshal General in the maintenance of order in general, the Director 
General of Transportation in all that affects such matters, and the 
Chief Engineer in all matters of administration and supply, are sub- 



Growtk of ordinate to the Commanding: General of the Service of Supply, who, 
assisted by a staff especially organized for the purpose, is charged 
the bervice ^.^j^ ^^^ administrative co-ordination of all these services. 

of Supply The transportation department under the Service of Supply directs 

the operation, maintenance, and construction of railways, the opera- 
tion of terminals, the unloading of ships, and transportation of mate- 
rial to warehouses or to the front. Its functions make necessary the 
most intimate relationship between our organization and that of the 
French, with the practical result that our transportation department 
has been able to improve materially the operations of railways gen- 
erally. Constantly laboring under a shortage of rolling stock, the 
transportation department has nevertheless been able by efficient man- 
agement to meet every emergency. 

The Engineer Corps is charged with all construction, including light 
railways and roads. It has planned and constructed the many projects 
required, the most important of which are the new wharves at Bordeau 
and Nantes, and the immense storage depots at La Pallice, Montoir, 
and Gievres, besides innumerable hospitals and barracks in various 
ports of France. These projects have all been carried on by phases keep- 
ing pace with our needs. The Forestry Service under the Engineer 
Corps has cut the greater part of the timber and railway ties required. 
To meet the shortage of supplies from America, due to lack of ship- 
ping, the representatives of the different supply departments were 
constantly in search of available material and supplies in Europe. In 
order to co-ordinate these purchases and to prevent competition between 
our departments, a general purchasing agency was created early in our 
experience to co-ordinate our purchases and, if possible, induce our 
Allies to apply the principle among the Allied armies. While there 
was no authority for the general use of appropriations, this was met 
by grouping the purchasing representatives of the different depart- 
ments under one control, charged with the duty of consolidating requi- 
sitions and purchases. Our efforts to extend the principle have been 
signally successful, and all purchases for the Allied armies are now 
on an equitable and co-operative basis. Indeed, it may be said that the 
work of this bureau has been thoroughly efficient and businesslike. 

A x-ii Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries neces- 

sary for its conduct in the modern sense. Among our most important 
Airplanes, deficiencies in material were artillery, aviation, and tanks. In order 
Q^j\^ Tanks to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer 
of the French Government to provide us with the necessary artillery 
equipment of seventy-fives, one fifty-five millimeter howitzers, and one 
fifty-five G P F guns from their own factories for thirty divisions. 
The wisdom of this course is fully demonstrated by the fact that, al- 
though we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at 
home, there were no guns of the calibers mentioned manufactured in 
America on our front at the date the armistice was signed. The only 
guns of these types produced at home thus far received in France are 
109 seventy-five millimeter guns. 

In aviation we were in the same situation, and here again the 
French Government came to our aid until our own aviation program 
should be under way. We obtained from the French the necessary 
planes for training our personnel, and they have provided us with a 
total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bombing planes. The first air- 
planes received from home arrived in May, and altogether we have 
received 1,379. The first American squadron completely equipped by 
American production, including airplanes, crossed the German lines 



/ 



Airplanes, 
and Tanks 



on August 7, 1918. As to tanks, we were also compelled to rely upon Artillery 
the French. Here, however, we were less fortunate, for the reason 
that the French production could barely meet the requirements of their 
own armies. 

It should be fully realized that the French Government has always 
taken a most liberal attitude and has been most anxious to give us 
every possible assistance in meeting our deficiencies in these as well 
as in other respects. Our dependence upon France for artillery, avia- 
tion, and tanks was, of course, due to the fact that our industries had 
not been exclusively devoted to military production. All credit is due 
our own manufacturers for their efforts to meet our requirements, as at 
the time the armistice was signed we were able to look forward to the 
early supply of practically all our necessities from our own factories. 

The welfare of the troops touches my responsibility as Commander 
in Chief to the mothers and fathers and kindred of the men who came 
to France in the impressionable period of youth. They could not have 
the privilege accorded European soldiers during their periods of leave 
of visiting their families and renewing their home ties. Fully realiz- 
ing that the standard of conduct that should be established for them 
must have a permanent influence in their lives and on the character 
of their future citizenship, the Red Cross, the Young Men's Christian 
Association, Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army, and the Jewish 
Welfare Board, as auxiliaries in this work, were encouraged in every 
possible way. The fact that our soldiers, in a land of different customs 
and language, have borne themselves in a manner in keeping with 
the cause for which they fought, is due not only to the efforts in their 
behalf but much more to ether high ideals, their discipline, and their 
innate sense of self-respect. It should be recorded, however, that the 
members of these welfare societies have been untiring in their desire 
to be of real service to our officers and men. The patriotic devotion of 
these representative men and women has given a new significance to 
the Golden Rule, and we owe to them a debt of gratitude that can 
never be repaid. 



During our periods of training in the trenches some of our divi- 
sions had engaged the enemy in local combats, the most important of 
which was Seicheprey by the Twenty-sixth on April 20, in the Toul 
sector, but none had participated in action as a unit. The First Division, 
which had passed through the preliminary stages of training, had gone 
to the trenches for its first period of instruction at the end of October 
and by March 21, when the German offensive in Picardy began, we had 
four divisions with experience in the trenches, all of which were equal 
to any demands of battle action. The crisis which this offensive de- 
veloped was such that our occupation of an American sector must be 
postponed. 

On March 28 I placed at the disposal of Marshal Foch, who had 
been agreed upon as Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies, all of 
our forces to be used as he might decide. At his request the First 
Division was transferred from the Toul sector to a position in reserve 
at Chaumont en Vexin. As German superiority in numbers required 
prompt action, an agreement was reached at the Abbeville conference 
of the Allied premiers and commanders and myself on May 2 by which 
British shipping was to transport ten American divisions to the British 
Army area, where they were to be trained and equipped, and additional 
British shipping was to be provided for as many divisions as possible 
for use elsewhere. 



Combat 
Operations 



Combat ^^^ April 26 the First Division had gone into the line in the Mont- 

^ . didier salient on the Picardy battlefront. Tactics had been suddenly 

Operations revolutionized to those of open warfare, and our men, confident of the 
results of their training, were eager for the test. On the morning of 
May 28 this division attacked the commanding German position in its 
front, taking with splendid da?h the town of Cantigny and all other 
objectives, which were organized and held steadfastly against vicious 
counter-attacks and galling artillery fire. Although local, this brilliant 
action had an electrical effect, as it demonstrated our fighting qualities 
under extreme battle conditions, and also that the enemy's troops were 
net altogether invincible. 

The Germans' Aisne offensive, which began on May 27, had ad- 
vanced rapidly toward the River Marne and Paris, and the Allies 
faced a crisis equally as grave as that of the Picardy offensive in 
March. Again every available man was placed at Marshal Foch's dis- 
posal, and the Third Division, which had just come from its preliminary 
training in the trenche?, was hurried to the Marne. Its motorized 
machine-gun battalion preceded the other units and successfully held 
the bridgehead at the Marne, opposite Chateau-Thierry. The Second 
Division, in reserve near Montdidier, was sent by motor trucks and 
other available transport to check the progress of the enemy toward 
Paris. The Division attacked and retook the town and railroad station 
at Bouresches and sturdily held its ground against the enemy's best 
guard divisions. In the Battle of Belleau Wood, which followed, our 
men proved their superiority and gained a strong tactical position, with 
far greater loss to the enemy than to ourselves. On July 1, before the 
Second was relieved, it captured the village of Vaux with most splen- 
did precision. 

Meanwhile our Second Corps, under Maj. Gen. George W. Head, 
had been organized for the command of our divisions with the British, 
which were held back in training areas or assigned to second-line de- 
fenses. Five of the ten divisions were withdrawn from the British area 
in June, three to relieve divisions in Lorraine and the Vosges and two 
to the Paris area to join the group of American divisions which stood 
between the city and any farther advance of the enemy in that direction. 
The great June-July troop movement from the States was well under 
way, and, although these troops were to be given some preliminary 
training before being put into action, their very presence warranted the 
use of all the older divisions in the confidence that we did not lack 
reserves. Elements of the Forty-seccnd Division were in the line ea-t 
of Bheims against the German offensive cf July 15, and held their 
ground unflinchingly. On the right flank of this offensive four com- 
panies of the Twenty-eighth Division were in position in face of the 
advancing waves of the German infantry. The Third Division was 
holding the bank of the Marne from the bend east of the mouth of ""he 
Surmelin to the west of Mezy, opposite Chateau-Thierry, where a large 
force of German infantry sought to force a passage under support of 
powerful artillery concentrations and under cover of smoke screens. A 
single regiment of the Third wrote cne of the most brilliant pages in 
our military annals on this occasion. It prevented the crossing at cer- 
tain points on its front while, on either flank, the Germans, who had 
gained a footing, pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, 
met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and suc- 
ceeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, cap- 
turing 600 prisoners. 
y The great force of the German Chateau-Thierry offensive established 

the deep Marne salient, but the enemy was taking chances, and the 



vulnerability of this pocket to attack might be turned to his dis- 
advantage. Seizing this opportunity to support my conviction, every 
division with any sort of training was made available for use in a 
counter-offensive. The place of honor in the thrust toward Soissons on 
July 18 was given to our First and Second Divisions in company with 
chosen French divisions. Without the usual brief warning of a pre- 
liminary bombardment, the massed French and American artillery, 
firing by the map, laid down its rolling barrage at dawn while the 
infantry began its charge. The tactical handling of our troops under 
these trying conditions was excellent throughout the action. The enenry 
brought up large numbers of reserves and made a stubborn defense 
both with machine guns and artillery, but through five days' fighting 
the First Division continued to advance until it had gained the heights 
above Soissons and captured the village of Berzy-le-sec. The Second 
Division took Beau Repaire farm and Vierzy in a very rapid advance 
and reached a position in front of Tigny at the end of its second day. 
These two divisions captured 7,000 prisoners and over 100 peices of 
artillery. 

The Twenty-sixth Division, which, with a French division, was 
under command of our First Corps, acted as a pivot of the movement 
toward Soissons. On the 18th it took the village of Torcy, while 
the Third Division was crossing the Marne in pursuit of the re- 
tiring enemy. The Twenty-sixth attacked again on the 21st, and the 
enemy withdrew past the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons road. The Third 
Division, continuing its progress, took the heights of Mont St. Pere and 
the villages of Charteves and Jaulgonne in the face of both machine- 
gun and artillery fire. 

On the 24th, after the Germans had fallen back from Trugny and 
Epied?, our Forty-second Division, which had been brought over from 
the Champagne, relieved the Twenty-sixth and, fighting its way through 
the Foret de Fere, overwhelmed the nest of machine guns in its path. 
By the 27th it had reached the Ourcq, whence the Third and Fourth 
Divisions were already advancing, while the French divisions with 
which we were co-operating were moving forward at other point-?. 

The Third Division had made its advance into Roncheres Wood on 
the 29th and was relieved for rest by a brigade of the Thirty-second. 
The Forty-second and Thirty-second undertook the task of conquering 
the heights beyond Cierges, the Forty-second capturing Sergy and the 
Thirty-second capturing Hill 230, both American divisions joining in 
the pursuit of the enemy to the Vesle, and thus the operation of re- 
ducing the salient was finished. Meanwhile the Forty-second was re- 
lieved by the Fourth at Chery-Chartreuve, and the Thirty-second by the 
Twenty-eighth, while the Seventy-seventh Division took up a position on 
the Vesle. The operations of these divisions on the Vesle were under the 
Third Corps. Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, commanding. 



Combat 
Operations 



With the reduction of the Marne salient we could look forward to 
the concentration of our divisions in our own zone. In view of the 
forthcoming operation against the St. Mihiel salient, which had long 
beefti planned as our first offensive action on a large scale, the First 
Army was organized on August 10 under my personal command. While 
American units had held different divisional and corps sectors along 
the western front, there had not been up to this time, for obvious 
reasons, a distinct American sector; but, in view of the important 
parts the American forces were now to play, it was necessary to take 
over a permanent portion of the line. Accordingly, on August 30, the 
line beginning at Port sur Seille, east of the Moselle and extending to 



Battle of 
St. Mihiel 



Battle of '^^^ "^^^^ through St. Mihiel, thence north to a point opposite Verdun, 
was placed under my command. The American sector was afterwards 
St. Mihiel extended across the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, 
and included the Second Colonial French, which held the point of the 
salient, and the Seventeenth French Corps, which occupied the heights 
above Verdun. 

The preparation for a complicated operation against the formidable 
defenses in front of us included the assembling of divisions and of 
corps and army artillery, transport, aircraft, tanks, ambulances, the 
location of hospitals, and the molding together of all of the elements of 
a great modern army with its own railheads, supplied directly by 
our own Service of Supply. The concentration for this operation, which 
was to be a surprise, involved the movement, mostly at night, of 
approximately 600,000 troops, and required for its success the most 
careful attention to every detail. 

The French were generous in giving us assistance in corps and 
army artillery, with its personnel, and we were confident from the start 
of our superiority over the enemy in guns of all calibers. Our heavy 
guns were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German 
rail movements. The French Independent Air Force was placed under 
my command which, together with the British bombing squadrons and 
our air forces, gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever 
been engaged in one operation on the western front. 

From Les Eparges around the nose of the salient at St. Mihiel to 
the Moselle River the line was roughly 40 miles long and situated on 
commanding ground greatly strengthened by artificial defenses. Our 
First Corps (Eighty-second, Nintieth, Fifth, and Second Divisions), 
under command of Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett, restrung its right on 
Pont-a-Mousson, with its left joining our Third Corps (the Eighty- 
ninth, Forty-second, and First Divisions), under Maj. Gen. Joseph T. 
Dickman, in line to Xivray, were to swing in toward Vigneulles on the 
pivot of the Moselle River for the initial assault. From Xivray to 
Mouilly the Second Colonial French Corps was in line in the center 
and our Fifth Corps, under command of Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron, 
with our Twenty-sixth Division and a French division at the western 
base of the salient, were to attack three difficult hills — -Les Eparges, 
Combres, and Amaramthe. Our First Corps had in reserve the Seventy- 
eighth Division, our Fourth Corps the Third Division, and our First 
Army the Thirty-fifth and Ninety-first Divisions, with the Eightieth 
and Thirty-third available. It should be understood that our corps 
organizations are very elastic, and that we have at no time had perma- 
nent assignments of divisions to corps. 

After four hours artillery preparation, the seven American divisions 
in the front line advanced at 5 A. M. on September 12, assisted by 
a limited number of tanks manned partly by Americans and partly by 
the French. These divisions, accompanied by groups of wire cutters 
and others armed with bangalore torpedoes, went through the suc- 
cessive bands of barbed wire that protected the enemy's front line and 
support trenches, in irresistible waves on schedule time, breaking down 
all defense of an enemy demoralized by the great volume of our artil- 
lery fire and our sudden approach out of the fog. 

Our First Corps advanced to Thiaucourt, while our Fourth Corps 
curved back to the southwest through Nonsard. The Second Colonial 
French Corps made the slight advance required of it on very difficult 
ground, and the Fifth Corps took its three ridges and repulsed a counter- 
attack. A rapid march brought reserve regiments of a division of the 
Fifth Corps into Vigneulles in the early morning, where it linked up 



with patrols of our Fourth Corps, closing the salient and forming a ]3aff1p q{ 
new line west of Thiaucourt to Vigneulles and beyond Fresnes-en- ^ A/T-i • l 
Woevre. At the cost of only 7,000 casualties, mostly light, we had ^^' -LViiniel 
taken 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns, a great quantity of material, re- 
leased the inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination, and 
established our lines in a position to threaten Metz. This signal suc- 
cess of the American First Army in its first offensive was of prime 
importance. The Allies found they had a formidable army to aid 
them, and the enemy learned finally that he had one to reckon with. 

On the day after we had taken the St. Mihiel salient, much of our ti *• 
corps and army artillery which had operated at St. Mihiel and our 
divisions in reserve at other points, were already on the move toward Argonne 
the area back of the line between the Meuse River and the western Offensive 
edge of the forest of Argonne. "With the exception of St. Mihiel, the -j-,. -p. 

old German front line from Switzerland to the east of Rheims was still ^ ^^^^ r^nase 
intact. In the general attack all along the line, the operation assigned 
the American Army as the hinge of this Allied offensive was directed 
toward the impoi'tant railroad communications of the German ai-miea 
through Mezieres and Sedan. The enemy must hold fast to this part 
of his lines or the withdrawal of his forces with four years' accumu- 
lation of plants and material would be dangerously imperiled. 

The German Army had as yet shown no demoralization and, while 
the mass of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-class divisions 
and notably its machine-gun defense were exhibiting remarkable tac- 
tical efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was 
fully aware of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne 
line. Certain that he would do everything in his power to oppose U3, 
the action was planned with as much secrecy as possible and was 
undertaken with the determination to use all our divisions in forcing 
a decision. We expected to draw the best German divisions to our front 
and to consume them while the enemy was held under grave appre- 
hension lest our attack should break his line, which it was our firm 
purpose to do. 

Our right flank was protected by the Meuse, while our left em- 
braced the Argonne Forest, whore ravines, hills, and elaborate defense 
screened by dense thickets had been generally considered impregnable. 
Our order of battle from right to left was the Third Corps from the 
Meuse to Malancourt, with the Thirty-third, Eightieth, and Fourth Divi- 
sions in line, and the Third Division as corps reserve; the Fifth Corps 
from Malancourt to Vauquois, with Seventy-ninth, Eighty-seventh, and 
Ninety-first Divisions in line, and the Thirty-second in corps reserve; and 
the First Corps, from Vauquois to Vienne le Chateau, with Thirty-fifth, 
Twenty-eighth, and Seventy-seventh Divisions in line, and the Ninety- 
second in corps reserve. The Army reserve consisted of the First, 
Twenty-ninth, and Eighty-second Divisions. 

On the night of September 25 our troops quietly took the place of 
the French who thinly held the line in this sector which had long been 
inactive. In the attack, which began on the 26th, we drove through 
the barbed wire entanglements and the sea of shell craters across No 
Man's Land, mastering all the first line defenses. Continuing on the 
27th and 28th, against machine guns and artillery of an increasing 
number of enemy reserve divisions, we penetrated to a depth of from 
three to seven miles, and took the village of Montfaucon and its com- 
manding hill and Exermont, Gercourt, Cuisy, Septsarges, Malancourt, 
Ivoiry, Epinonville, Charpentry, Very, and other villages. East of 
the Meuse one of our divisions, which was with the Second Colonial 



Meuse- ^I'eiich Corps, captured Marcheville and Rieville, g-iving further pro- 

. ^ tection to the flank of our main body. "We had taken 10,000 prisoners, 

i-vrgOline ^^ tm^ gained our point of forcing the battle into the open and were 

Orrensive, prepared for the enemy's reaction, which was bound to come as he had 

"p- X pU;aep good roads and ample railroad facilities for bringing up his artillery 

and reserves. 

In the chill rain of dark nights our engineers had to build new 
roads across spongy, shell-torn areas, repair broken roads beyond No 
Man's Land, and build bridges. Our gunners, with no thought of 
sleep, put their shoulders to wheels and dragropes to bring their guns 
through the mire in support of the infantry, now under the increasing 
fire of the enemy's artillery. Our attack had taken the enemy by sur- 
prise, but, quickly recovering himself, he began to fiire counterattacks 
in strong force, supported by heavy bombardments, with large quan- 
tities of gas. From September 28 until October 4 we maintained the 
offensive against patches of woods defended by snipers and continuous 
lines of machine guns, and pushed forward our guns and transport, 
seizing strategical points in preparation for further attacks. 

Oflier Tin if s Other divisions attached to the Allied armies were doing their part. 

ixr- T All- "^^ ^^^ *^^ fortune of our Second Corps, composed of the Twenty- 
W ith Allies seventh and Thirtieth Divisions, which had remained with the British, 
to have a place of honor in co-operation with the Australian Corps on 
September 29 and October 1 in the assault on the Kindenburg Line 
where the St. Quentin Canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge. 
The Thirtieth Division speedily broke through the main line of de- 
fense for all its objectives, while the Twenty-seventh pushed on impetu- 
ously through the main line until some of its elements reached Gouy. 
In the midst of the maze of trenches and shell craters and under cross- 
fire from machine guns the other elements fought desperately against 
odds. In this and in later actions, from October 6 to October 19, our 
Second Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced over 13 miles. 
The spirit and aggressiveness of these divisions have been highly 
praised by the British Army commander under whom they served. 

On October 2-9 our Second and Thirty-sixth Divisions were sent to 
assist the French in an important attack against the old German posi- 
tions before Rheims. The Second conquered the complicated defense 
works on their front against a persistent defense worthy of the grim- 
mest period of trench warfare and attacked the strongly held wooded 
hill of Blanc Mont, which they captured in a second assault, sweeping 
over it with consummate dash and skill. This division then repulsed 
strong counter-attacks before the village and cemetery of Ste. Etienne 
and took the town, forcing the Germans to fall back from before 
Rheims and yield positions they had held since September, 1914. On 
October 9 the Thirty-sixth Division relieved the Second and, in its first 
experience under fire, withstood very severe artillery bombardment and 
rapidly took up the pursuit of the enemy, now retiring behind the 
Aisne. 

Metise- '^^^^ Allied progress elsewhere cheered the efforts of our men in 

this crucial contest as the German command threw in more and more 
iVrgonne first-class troops to stop our advance. We made steady headway in the 
Offensive almost impenetrable and strongly held Argonne Forest, for, despite this 
reinforcement, it was our Army that was doing the driving. Our air- 
craft was increasing in skill and numbers and forcing the issue, and 
our infantry and artillery were improving rapidly with each new ex- 
perience. The replacements fresh from home were put into exhausted 
divisions with little time for training, but they had the advantage of 



idPb 



serving beside men who knew their business and who had almost be- Meuse- 

come veterans overnight. The enemy had taken every advantage of the . 

terrain, which especially favored the defense by a prodigal use of ^^^S^^^^ 

machine guns manned by highly trained veterans and by using his Offensive, 

artillery at short ranges. In the face of such strong frontal positions C J "D1 

1, 1^ 1, 1, 1,1 ^ T 1, J- X oecond rhase 

we should have been unable to accomplish any progress according to 
previously accepted standards, but I had every confidence in our 
aggressive tactics and the courage of our troops. 

On October 4 the attack was renewed all along our front. The Third 
Corps tilting to the left followed the Brieulles-Cunel road; our Fifth 
Corps took Gesnes, while the First Corps advanced for over two miles 
along the irregular valley of the Aire River and in the wooded hills of 
the Argonne that bordered the river, used by the enemy with all his 
art and weapons of defense. This sort of fighting continued against 
an enemy striving to hold every foot of ground and whose very strong 
counter-attacks challenged us at every point. On the 7th the First 
Corps captured Chatel-Chehery and continued along the river to Cornay. 
On the east of Meuse sector one of the two divisions co-operating with 
the French captured Consenvoye and the ITaumont Woods. On the 9th 
the Fifth Corps, in its progress up the Aire, took Fleville, and the 
Third Corps which had continuous fighting against odds was working 
its way through Brieulles and Cunel. On the lOtli we had cleared the 
Argonne Forest of the enemy. 

It was now necessary to constitute a second army, and on October 9 
the immediate command of the First Army was turned over to Lieut. 
Gen. Hunter Liggett. The command of the Second Army, whose divi- 
sions occupied a sector in the Woevre, was given to Lieut. Gen. Robert 
L. Bullard, who had been commander of the First Division and then 
of the Third Corps. Maj. Gen. Dickman was transferred to the com- 
mand of the First Corps, while the Fifth Corps was placed under Maj. 
Gen. Charles P. Summerall, who had recently commanded the First 
Division. Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, who had gone rapidly up from 
regimental to division commander, was assigned to the Third Corps. 
These four ofiicers had been in France from the early days of the expe- 
dition and had learned their lessons in the school of practical warfare. 

Our constant pressure against the enemy brought day by day more 
prisoners, mostly survivors from machine-gun nests captured in fight- 
ing at close quarters. On October 18 there was very fierce fighting in 
the Caures "Woods east of the Meuse and in the Ormont Woods. On the 
14th the First Corps took St. Juvin, and the Fifth Corps, in hand-to- 
hand encounters, entered the formidable Kriemhilde Line, where the 
enemy had hoped to check us indefinitely. Later the Fifth Corps pene- 
trated further the Kriemhilde Line, and the First Corps took Cham- 
pigneulles and the important town of Grandpre. Our dogged offensive 
was wearing down the enemy, who continued desperately to throw his 
best troops against us, thus weakening his line in front of our Allies 
and making their advance less difficult. 

Meanwhile we were not only able to continue the battle, but our T)i visions in 
Thirty-seventh and Ninety-first Divisions were hastily withdrawn from -^ - . 
our front and dispatched to help the French Army in Belgium. De- Jjelgium 
training in the neighborhood of Ypres, these divisions advanced by 
rapid stages to the fighting line and were assigned to adjacent French 
corps. On October 31, in continuation of the Flanders offensive, they 
attacked and methodically broke down all enemy resistance. On Novem- 
ber 3 the Thirty-seventh had completed its mission in dividing the 
enemy across the Escaut River and firmly established itself along the 



Meuse- 6^st bank included in the division zone of action. By a clever flanking 

i movement troops of the Ninety-first Division captured Spitaals Bosschen, 

i\rgOnne, ^ difiicult wood extending across the central part of the division sector, 

Last Phase reached the Escaut, and penetrated into the town of Audenarde. These 

divisions received high ccmmendation from their corps commanders for 

their dash and energy. 

On the 23d the Third and Fifth Corps pushed northward to the level 
of Bantheville. While we continued to press forward and throw back 
the enemy's violent counter-attacks with great loss to him, a regroup- 
ing of our forces was under way for the final assault. Evidences of loss 
of morale by the enemy gave our men more confidence in attack and 
more fortitude in enduring the fatigue of incessant effort and the hard- 
ships of very inclement weather. 

With comparatively well-rested divisions, the final advance in the 
Meuse-Argonne front was begun on TTovembsr 1. Our increased artil- 
lery force acquitted itself magnificently in support of the advance, and 
the enemy broke before the determined infantry, which, by its per- 
sistent fighting of the past weeks and the dash of this attack, had 
overcome his will to resist. The Third Corps took Aincreville, Doulcon, 
and Andevanne, and the Fifth Corps tock Landres et St. Georges and 
pressed through successive lines of resistance to Bayonville and Chen- 
nery. On the 2d the First Corps joined in the movement, which now 
became an impetuous onslaught that could not be stayed. 

On the 3d advance troops surged forward in pursuit, some by motor 
trucks, while the artillery pressed along the country roads close behind. 
The First Corps reached Authe and Chatillon-Sur-Bar, the Fifth Corps, 
Fosse and Nouart, and the Third Corps Kalles, penetrating the enemy's 
line to a depth of 12 miles. Our large caliber guns had advanced and 
were skillfully brought into position to fire upon the important lines 
at Montmedy, Longuyon, and Conflans. Our Third Corps crossed the 
Meuse on the 5th and the other corps, in the full confidence that the 
day was theirs, eagerly cleared the way of machine guns as they swept 
northward, maintaining complete co-ordination throughout. On the 6th, 
a division of the First Corps reached a point on the Meuse opposite 
Sedan, 25 miles from our line of departure. The strategical goal which 
was our highest hope was gained. We had cut the enemy's main line 
of communications and nothing but surrender or an armistice could 
save his army from complete disaster. 

In all 40 enemy divisions had been used against us in the Meuse- 
Argonne battle. Between September 26 and November 6 we took 26,059 
prisoners and 468 guns on this front. Our divisions engaged were the 
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-eighth, 
Twenty-ninth, Thirty-second, Thirty-third, Thirty-fifth, Thirty-seventh, 
Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, Seventy-ninth, Eightieth, 
Eighty-second, Eighty-ninth, Ninetieth, and Ninety-first. Many of our 
divisions remained in line for a length of time that required nerves of 
steel, while others were sent in again after only a few days of rest. 
The First, Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Forty-second, Seventy-seventh, Eightieth, 
Eighty-ninth, and Ninetieth were in the line twice. Although some of 
the divisions were fighting their first battle, they soon became equal 
to the best. 



Onerations ^^ *^® three days preceding November 10, the Third, the Second 

Colonial, and the Seventeenth French Corps fought a difficult struggle 
through the Meuse Hills south of Stenay and forced the enemy into 
Meuse the plain. Meanwhile, my plans for further use of the American forces 
contemplated an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle in the 



East of the 



East of the 
Meuse 



direction of Longwy by the First Army, while, at the same time, the Operations 
Second Army should assure the offensive toward the rich iron fields of 
Briey. These operations were to be followed by an offensive toward 
Chateau-Salins east cf the Moselle, thus isolating Metz. Accordingly, 
attacks on the American front had been ordered and that of the Second 
Army was in progress on the morning of November 11, when instruc- 
tions were received that hostilities should cease at 1 1 o'clock A. M. 

At this moment the line of the American sector, from right to left, 
began at Port-Sur-Seille, thence across the Moselle to Vandieres and 
through the Woevre to Bezonvaux, in the foothills of the Meuse, thence 
along to the foothills and through the northern edge of the Woevre 
forests to the Meuse at Mouzay, thence along the Meuse connecting with 
the French under Sedan. 



Co-operation among the Allies has at all times been most cordial. A Relations 
far greater effort has been put forth by the Allied armies and staffs to vy-zi ;i 
assist us than could have been expected. (The French Government and 
Army have always stood ready to furnish us with supplies, equipment. Allies 
and transportation, and to aid us in every way. In the towns and ham- 
lets wherever our troops have been stationed or billeted the French 
people have everywhere received them more as relatives and intimate 
friends than as soldiers of a foreign army. For these things words are 
quite inadequate to express our gratitude. There can be no doubt that the 
relations growing out of our associations here assure a permanent 
friendship between the two peoples, i Although we have not been so 
intimately associated with the pecpTe of G-reat Britain, yet their troops 
and ours when thrown together have always warmly fraternized. The 
reception of those of our forces who have passed through England and 
of those who have been stationed there has always been enthusiastic. 
Altogether it has been deeply impressed upon us that the ties of 
language and blood bring the British and ourselves together completely 
and inseparably. 



There are in Europe altogether, including a regiment and some 
sanitary units with the Italian i^rmy and the organizations at Mur- 
mansk, also including those en route from the States, approximately 
2,053,347 men, less our losses. Of this total, there are in France 
1,338,169 combatant troops. Forty divisions have arrived, of which the 
infantry personnel of ten have been used as replacements, leaving 30 
divisions now in France organized into three armies of three corps each. 

The losses of the Americans up to November 18 are: Killed and 
wounded, 36,145: died of disease, 14,811: deaths unclassified, 2,204: 
wounded, 179,625; prisoners, 2,163: missing, 1,160. We have captured 
about 44,000 prisoners and 1,400 guns, howitzers and trench mortars. 



Strength 



The duties of the General Staff, as well as those of the army and 
corps staffs, have been very ably performed. Especially is this true 
when we consider the new and difiicult problems with which they have 
been confronted. This body of officers, both as individuals and as an 
organization, have, I believe, no superiors in professional ability, in 
efficiency, or in loyalty. 

Nothing that we have in France better reflects the efl&ciency and 
devotion to duty of Americans in general than the Service of Supply, 
whose personnel is thoroughly imbued with a patriotic desire to do 
its full duty. They have at all times fully appreciated their responsi- 
bility to the rest of the army and the results produced have been 
most gratifying. 



Commen- 
dation 



elation 



Commen- ^^^' ^^^ical Corps is especially entitled to praise for the general 

effectiveness of its work both in hospital and at the front. Embracing 
men of high professional attainments, and splendid women devoted to 
their calling and untiring in their efforts, this department has made 
a new record for medical and sanitary proficiency. 

The Quartermaster Department has had difficult and various tasks, 
but it has more than met all demands that have been made upon it. 
Its management and its personnel have been exceptionally efficient and 
deserve every possible commendation. 

As to the more technical services, the able personnel of the Ordnance 
Department in France has splendidly fulfilled its functions, both in 
procurement and in forwarding the immense quantities of ordnance 
required. The officers and men and the young women of the Signal 
Corps have performed their duties with a large conception of the prob- 
lem and with a devoted and patriotic spirit to which the perfection of 
our communications daily testify. While the Engineer Corps has been 
referred to in another part of this repoz't, it should be further stated 
that the work has required large vision and high professional skill, 
and great credit is due their personnel for the high proficiency that 
they have constantly maintained. 

Our aviators have no equals in daring or in fighting ability and 
have left a record of courageous deeds that will ever remain a brilliant 
page in the annals of our army. While the Tank Corps has had limited 
opportunities its personnel has responded gallantly on every possible 
occasion and has shown courage of the highest order. 

The Adjutant General's Department has been directed with a sys- 
tematic thoroughness and excellence that surpassed any previous work 
of its kind. The Inspector General's Department has risen to the highest 
standards and throughout has ably assisted commanders in the enforce- 
ment of discipline. The able personnel of the Judge Advocate General's 
Department has solved with judgment and wisdom the multitude of 
difficult legal problems, many of them involving questions of great inter- 
national importance. 

It would be impossible in this brief preliminary report to do justice 
to the personnel of all the different branches of this organization which 
I shall cover in detail in a later report. 

The Navy in European waters has at all times most cordially aided 
the Army, and it is most gratifying to report that there has never 
before been such perfect co-operation between these two branches of 
the service. 

As to Americans in Europe not in the military services, it is the 
greatest pleasure to say that, both in official and in private life, they 
are intensely patriotic and loyal, and have been invariably sympathetic 
and helpful to the Army. 

Finally, I pay the supreme tribute to our officers and soldiers of 
the line. When I think of their heroism, their patience under hard- 
ships, their unflinching spirit of offensive action, I am filled with 
emotion which I am unable to express. Their deeds are immortal, and 
they have earned the eternal gratitude of our country. 

I am, Mr. Secretary, very respectfully, 

JOHN J. PERSHING, 

General, Commander in Chief, 
American Expeditionary Forces. 
To the Secretary of War. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



020 932 286 9 



PUBLISHED BY 

MEYER 8e THALHEIMER 

BALTIMORE, MD. 



LIBRfiRY OF CONGRESS 



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